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Walking in Sunshine, or Away From It? Creating a Unified
Transparency Index
John Hogan (DIT), Raj Chari (TCD) and Gary Murphy (DCU)
Abstract: Despite the strengths of the two bodies of literature on Freedom of
Information (FOI) and Lobbying Regulation, a main inadequacy is that they fail to
meet each other. The reason why both the FOI and lobbying regulation literatures
need to be synthesized is that both should be seen as the two sides of the deliberative
democracy coin: FOI legislation aims to regulate the actions of state officials, while
lobbying laws seek to regulate the actions of private interests attempting to influence
such officials. The novelty of this paper is that we thus extend and link the ideas
raised in these two bodies of literature, by performing a comparative analysis across
16 jurisdictions in North America, Europe and Asia. Our first main goal is to identify
a measure for the effectiveness of FOI legislation throughout the world that can be
compared on a normalized scale. Secondly, we combine these scores with those from
the extant literature on lobbying regulations, producing what we refer to as an overall
‘sunshine score.’ This score will represent one of the first encompassing transparency
measures in the literature, which helps us better conceptualize a unified understanding
the relationship between FOI and lobbying rules, as well as the openness of
democratic systems throughout the world.

Introduction and Objectives
Deliberative democratic theory is based upon the idea that all political acts are public
acts (Elster, 1998). Its central principles are that the reasons for political decisions,
along with the information necessary to assess those reasons, should be in the public
domain; and the officials who made the decisions should be accountable (Gutmann
and Thompson, 2004, 135; O’Flynn, 2006, 101). The theory is thus anchored in
accountability, which is perceived to supersede consent as the conceptual core of
democratic legitimacy (Chambers, 2003, 307). It is invested with the expectation that
all policies chosen, decisions made and laws implemented, will be justified to the
electorate (Thompson, 2008, 498). As such, the concept of transparency, too, guides
deliberative democratic scholars. As Stasavage (2004, 668) argues, deliberations
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occurring openly in public ‘increase the quality and the legitimacy of decisions
taken.’
To promote transparency and accountability that is espoused by deliberative
democratic theory, governments throughout the world have pursued two main
initiatives - freedom of information (FOI) laws and lobbying regulations. These
initiatives have been highlighted in two related, but heretofore separate, bodies of
literature.
In one body, FOI scholars such as Lindberg (2005, 5) have noted that FOI
legislation emerged from the long history of conflict between secrecy and openness in
politics. The idea of FOI has been around since the principle of openness Offentlighetsgrundsatsen – was enshrined in Swedish law in 1766 (Banisar, 2006).
Cogent works by scholars such as Roberts (2001, 244) argue that ‘FOI laws have
diffused rapidly throughout the advanced democracies over the last thirty years, and
their organizing principle – the promotion of transparency in policy-making and
operations – has become entrenched as one of the main precepts of good
administration.’ There was a particularly dramatic increase in the number of FOI laws
around the turn of the century (Ackerman and Sandoval-Ballesteros, 2006, 98;
Banisar, 2006). Today’s FOI legislation thus promises that open access to
governmental information should result in: increased transparency in the policymaking process (Piotrowski and Rosenbloom, 2002; Fox and Haight, 2011, 354);
reduced corruption (Banisar, 2006, 6); and greater public participation in policy
formulation within the area of open and accountable government (Stubbs 2008, 1;
Hunt and Chapman, 2010, 1; Lidberg 2009, 267.) However, Banisar (2006)
discovered that many FOI laws promote access in name only. In some jurisdictions
the laws lie dormant, while in others they are abused by governments. Restructuring
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has also undermined some of these laws by shifting authority to private agencies and
away from the government departments to which the legislation applied (Roberts,
2001, 245). Roberts (2006) argues that the weakening of the influence of FOI laws is
particularly problematic, as a number of our fundamental human rights are dependent
upon our ability to access government information. In spite of FOI legislation, states
will continue to keep secrets and while some level of governmental secrecy is
probably unavoidable, it is vital to understand the social costs this will entail
(Ellington, 2011, 85).
In a second body of literature, scholars have examined the regulation of
lobbying, where political systems establish rules that lobbyists must comply with
when attempting to influence public officials. Such regulations are therefore
concerned with illuminating the action of private interests when influencing public
actors. Examples of rules include: registering with the state before any contact can be
made with a public office holder; clearly stating the bill/initiatives that the lobbyists
seeks to influence; giving individual and employer spending disclosures of amounts
spent on lobbying; and establishing revolving door provisions where politicians are
not allowed to enter into the world of lobbying immediately after leaving office.
Regulations constrain the actions of lobbyists and public officials, even if they do not
impact upon the power variations between groups (Thomas, 2004, 287). Advocates
of regulations believe they help guarantee an adequate level of transparency with
respect to the activities of lobbyists – enabling the public to exercise their right to
know who is attempting to influence political decisions (Francis, 1993; Bertók, 2008;
Obradovic, 2009, Wonka et al., 2010).

Because the information given when

registering is available for citizens to scrutinize, public officials can also be held
accountable for their actions (Chari et al., 2007). Some studies on the robustness of
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lobbying laws suggest that the US has led the way in regulating the activities of
lobbyists (Zetter, 2009, 16), while others suggest there are various regulatory
environments found globally, particularly high, medium, and lowly regulated systems
as seen in the US, Canada and the EU, respectively (Chari et al, 2010, 108-9).
Despite the strengths of these two related sets of literature, a main inadequacy
is that they have failed to meet each other. The reason why both the FOI and lobbying
regulation literatures need to be synthesized is because both should be seen as the two
sides of the deliberative democracy coin: FOI legislation aims to regulate the actions
of state officials, while lobbying laws seek to regulate the actions of private interests
attempting to influence such officials. The novelty of this paper is that we thus extend
and link ideas raised in these two bodies of literature.
Despite the fact that a number of studies have examined the development and
evolution of FOI legislation, none has offered a comparative analysis that classifies
the laws in terms of their strengths. Our main goal here is to first, set out the
effectiveness of FOI legislation across a range of national jurisdictions in North
America, Europe, Australia and Asia. The results will be a significant addition to the
literature, because many studies examining FOI have largely offered single country
analysis and relied upon qualitative methods to do so (see for example, Heald, 2003;
Kirtley, 2006). Secondly, we will combine these FOI results with measures on the
strength of lobbying regulations established in the extant literature and produce what
we refer to as a ‘sunshine score’: this score will represent the first encompassing
transparency measures in the literature. It will help us to better conceptualize a
unified understanding of the relationship between FOI and lobbying rules, as well as
the openness of democratic systems throughout the world.
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In terms of structure, the next section outlines and justifies the countries
selected for examination.

Thereafter, we set out a method for scoring the

effectiveness of FOI legislation. Based on these scores, and those that measure
lobbying regulation robustness, ‘sunshine scores’ are calculated. The subsequent
section offers reflections on what is referred to as a ‘conceptual map of transparency’
before turning to the conclusions.

Jurisdictions Examined: A Worldwide Comparative Approach
This study adopts a comparative approach to understanding public policy
developments in relation to transparency and accountability on a global scale,
analyzing developments in FOI and lobbying regulations in 16 jurisdictions
worldwide. The comparative approach allows us discover trends and achieve an
understanding of broader characteristics (Blondel, 1995). The jurisdictions selected
were Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Lithuania, Philippians,
Poland, Slovenia, Taiwan, the United States, Denmark, Ireland, Spain and the United
Kingdom. The first 12 jurisdictions are all of the countries in the world with both
lobbying regulations and FOI regulations currently in place.

The latter four

jurisdictions are countries that are on the verge of introducing lobbying regulations
and have FOI regulations in place.

Thus, this selection consists of a mix of

jurisdictions with strong, medium, low and no lobbying regulations, but all of which
have FOI regulations (Chari et al., 2010). By studying all of the countries in the
world with both lobbying and FOI regulations, we are able to get a picture of what it
is like to have encompassing transparency regulations (lobbying and FOI), and we
can contrast these results with those from the selected jurisdictions that possess only
FOI regulations at the moment.
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Table 1: CPI scores for the selected Jurisdictions
Jurisdiction
High Regulation
US
62
Medium Regulation
Canada Federal
50
Hungary
45
Lithuania
44
Philippians
39
Taiwan
38
Slovenia
35
Australia
33
Low Regulation
Poland
27
Israel
21
France
19
Germany
17
No Regulation
Ireland
0
Denmark
0
UK
0
Spain
0
Source: Chari et al., 2010.
All of the countries selected here are liberal-market democracies. And all have
enacted FOI laws, or placed FOI rights in their constitutions over the last 50 years, as
shown in Table 2 below. Thus, of these 16 countries, 12 are the only jurisdictions in
the world that combine lobbying regulations and FOI regulations.
Table 2 – Introduction of FOI Legislation
Jurisdiction
US Federal
France
Australia Commonwealth
Canada Federal
Denmark
Philippians
Spain
Lithuania
Ireland
Poland
Israel
United Kingdom
Hungary

FOI Regulations and year of first introduction
The Freedom of Information Act 19661
Loi n°78-753 du 17 juillet 1978 portant diverses mesures d’amélioration des
relations entre l’administration et le public et diverses dispositions
Freedom of Information Act 1982
Access to Information Act 1982
Access to Public Administration Files Act 1985
Philippians Bill of Rights 1987
Article 105 of Constitución Espanola 1978 and Law on Rules for Public
Administration 1992
Law on the Provision of Information to the Public 19962
Freedom of Information Act 19973
Article 61 of the Constitution of 1997 and Law on Access to Public Information
2001
Freedom of Information Law 1998
Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Freedom of Information (Scotland)
Act 2002
Act LXIII on the Protection of Personal Data and Public Access to Data of
Public Interest 2002

7
Slovenia
Germany
Taiwan

Access to public Information Act 2003
Federal Act Governing Access to Information Held by the Federal Government
2005
Freedom of Government Information Law 20064

As Table 2 shows, some jurisdictions such as the US were amongst the first adopters
of FOI legislation in the 1960s. France in the late 1970s, Denmark, Australia and
Canada in the 1980s, were amongst the second set of adopters. Lithuania, Ireland,
Poland, Israel and the UK were in the third wave to implement FOI legislation at the
turn of the century, with Taiwan in the fourth wave in 2006 (Hazell and Worthy,
2010).
The US has a long history of lobbying regulations, at both the state and federal
levels; the Philippians introduced lobbying regulations in 1957 - modelled on those in
the US at the time; Canada has had lobbying regulations in place since 1989 at the
federal level as well as in 7 provinces now; Germany had lobbying regulations at the
state and federal level; Australia had had lobbying regulations at the federal level
since 2007 and now in all states as well. France, Hungary, Israel, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovenia and Taiwan all have lobbying rules in force at present. While four of the
first five countries mentioned above are federal states and adopted lobbying laws in
the 19th and 20th centuries, the latter seven countries adopted lobbying rules only since
the turn of the century (see Chari et al., Chapters 2 and 3). Australian has the dubious
distinction of being one of the few countries to introduce lobbying regulations in the
early 1980s, only to repeal these in 1996, before reintroducing them in 2007 (Hogan
et al., 2011). Denmark, Ireland, Spain the UK do not have lobbying legislation at
present (although the these government are all either investigating the possibilities of
introducing such rules, or are actively drafting lobbying legislation).
Furthermore, in terms of variations between the countries, some jurisdictions
studied are republics, while others are constitutional monarchies; some are
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presidential forms of governments, others parliamentary; some are unitary states,
others federal; and some are national-level jurisdictions while others are
state/provincial.

Table 3 summarizes FOI legislation and lobbying laws (if

applicable) in force at the national level in each of the countries examined, as well as
in the political institutions of the EU.

Table 3: FOI and Lobbying Legislation in the selected countries
Australia
The federal government
introduced the Freedom of
Information Act in 1982.5
Australian was amongst the
‘second wave’ of countries
introducing FOI legislation
(Hazell and Worthy, 2010).
Victoria
introduced
a
similar act in 19826, with
Queensland7
and
Tasmanian8 being the last
states to introduce FOI
regulations in 2009. Bayne
(1993) sees these laws as a
break
with
AngloAustralian legal tradition.
There
are
lobbying
regulations in all states and
the federal level.
Germany
The federal government
introduced the Federal Act
Governing
Access
to
Information Held by the
Federal Government –
(Informationsfreiheitsgesetz
- IFG) – in 2005. Under
this ‘everyone is entitled to
official information from
the authorities.’12 Germany
introduced
lobbying
regulations in 1951, with
amendment in 1975 and
1980 (Chari et al., 2010).

Lithuania
1
2

Canada
FOI laws have been in
place in Canada at
federal,
provincial
and territorial levels
since the late 1970s.
Nova Scotia first
introduced
the
Freedom
of
Information
and
Protection of Privacy
Act (1977)9.
The
federal government
introduced the Access
to Information Act in
1985.10
There are
lobbying regulations
at the federal level
and
in
seven
provinces (see Table
2).
Hungary
The Act LXIII on the
Protection of Personal
Data
and
Public
Access to Data of
Public Interest was
introduced in 1992.
This guarantees ‘the
right of everyone to
exercise control over
his or her personal
data and to have
access to data of
public
interest.’13
Hungary introduced
lobbying regulations
in 2006, but repealed
these in 2011 (Chari
et al., 2011).

Denmark
The Access to Public
Administration Files
Act was introduced in
Denmark
1985.11
does not regulate
lobbyists. ‘A salient
feature
of
the
Scandinavian political
systems has been to
involve
interest
groups in the policymaking
process
without
having
formalised
regulations’
(Rechtman,
1998,
579).

France
France
introduced
freedom
of
information
legislation in 1978.1
Article 26(1) of
the general directives
of the Bureau of the
National Assembly
also states that those
with special cards
issued personally by
the president or by
the quaestors may
have access to the
Salon de la Paix
(Chari et al., 2010).

Ireland
Ireland introduced the
Freedom
of
Information
Act
(1997).
This
legislation
was
amended in six years
later.14 There are no
lobbying regulations
despite
various
political
parties
promising
their
introduction
(McGrath,
2009).
The
current
government is in the
process of consulting
the public over such a
law.

Philippians

Poland

Israel
Israel introduced its
Freedom
of
Information Law, in
1998.2 The law has
improved
transparency, but has
not
been
an
overwhelming
success (Rabin and
Peled, 2005). Israel
introduced lobbying
regulations in 2008.
However,
Veksler
(2011) argues that
these
regulations
have provided only
symbolic
transparency for the
public.
Slovenia

http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000339241
http://www.freedominfo.org/documents/Israel--FOIL1998.pdf
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FOI is guaranteed under
Article 25 of the 1992
constitution.15 ‘The general
principle of freedom of
information’
(Banisar,
2006, 103) was set out in
Law on the Provision of
Information to the Public
enacted in 1996 and
amended
in
2002.16
Lithuania passed the Law
on
Lobbying
Activity
(LLA) in 2000.

Spain
Article 105 of the 1978
constitution
guarantees
access
to
government
information.19 The Law on
Rules
for
Public
Administration
(1992)
provides for access to
government
records20
(Banisar,
2006,
139).
Spain does not regulate
lobbying.

The
right
to
information
was
enshrined
in
the
constitution in 1987
(Banisar, 2006, 122).
Currently a freedom
of information bill is
in the Philippians
parliament. RA 1827
is the lobbying act
passed
in
the
Philippians in 1957,
making it one of the
first countries in the
world to regulate this
activity - however it
had not been fully
enforced.3
Taiwan
The
Freedom
of
Information Law was
introduced at the very
end of 2005, coming
into force in 2006.
In
2007
Taiwan
introduced
the
Lobbying Act. with
the aim of creating
"open and transparent
procedures
for
lobbying".6
This
would permit the
public and media see
who is lobbying and
why.7

The
right
to
information
is
guaranteed
under
Article 61 of the 1997
Constitution.17
The
Law on Access to
Public Information,
was passed in 2001.
A citizen must receive
feedback within two
weeks.18 In 2005, the
Act on Legislative
and
Regulatory
Lobbying
was
introduced
(Galkowski,
2008,
131).

FOI is guaranteed
under
both
the
Slovenian
constitution (Banisar,
2006, 133) and the
Access to Public
Information
Act
passed in 2003 and
amended in 2005.4 It
introduced a lobbying
law in 2010 - The
Integrity
and
Prevention
of
Corruption Act.5

The United
Kingdom
FOI was introduced in
the
Freedom
of
Information Act 2000
and the Freedom of
Information
(Scotland) Act 200221.
Despite the lobbying
of policy makers
being
deeply
ingrained, the UK has
not
introduced
lobbying regulations
(Parvin,
2007).
However,
the
government
is
currently consulting
on a statutory register
of lobbyists.

The United States
In 1966 the Freedom
of Information Act
was introduced,
making the US the
fourth country to
have FOI legislation
(Vleugels, 2009).
This has been
amended three times
to take account of
electronic media. All
states and territories
have FOI legislation.
The federal
government has been
regulating lobbyists
since 1946, while all
50 states have
lobbying laws today.

Determining an ‘FOI Score’
In order to attain a better understanding of the strength of the transparency initiatives
in each of the jurisdictions studied, this section will outline the quantitative indices
used to measure the strength of lobbying laws and FOI legislation.

3

http://www.thelobbyist.biz/policy-matters/1153-lobby-reform
https://www.ip-rs.si/index.php?id=324
5
http://www.regulatelobbying.com/images/Slovenia_Lobbying_Law-3.pdf
6
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/news/news_detail.aspx?id=3281
7
http://www.cepd.gov.tw/encontent/m1.aspx?sNo=0010668&key=&ex=%20&ic=&cd=
4

10
When turning to measuring the strength of lobbying laws, while authors such
as Opheim (1991) and Brinig et al. (1993) attempted to measure the strength of
lobbying rules in the US, more recent literature has established that perhaps the most
robust measures to comparatively analyze the strength of lobbying rules worldwide is
using the Center of Public Integrity’s (CPI) Index (see, Chari et al, 2007 & 2010;
Hogan et al., 2011). CPI’s analysis, whose objective is to better understand the
transparency and accountability promoted by lobbying laws, is referred to as the
‘Hired Guns’ method, resulting in ‘CPI Scores.’

The CPI writes that
‘Hired Guns’ is an analysis of lobby disclosure laws... The Center
for Public Integrity created a ranking system that assigns a score to
each state (with lobbying legislation) based on a survey containing a
series of questions regarding state lobby disclosure. The questions
addressed eight key areas of disclosure for state lobbyists and the
organizations that put them to work:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Definition of Lobbyist
Individual Registration
Individual Spending Disclosure
Employer Spending Disclosure
Electronic Filing
Public Access (to a registry of lobbyists)
Enforcement
Revolving Door Provisions (with a particular focus on
‘cooling off periods’)22

Each lobbying law is analyzed by way of textual analysis with a total of 48 questions
for the above eight sections outlined by the CPI. Each question is thus assigned a
point value according to the answer.23 The scale of final scorings ranks between 1
(weak lobbying legislation) to 100 (most robust lobbying rules that promote full
transparency). Chari et. al (2010) have argued that systems that have a point scoring
between 1 and 29 can be considered ‘lowly regulated systems’; between 30 and 59
can be considered ‘medium regulation’; and over 60 can be considered ‘high
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regulation.’ Chari et al. (2010) and Hogan et. al (2011) have calculated the CPI scores
for most of the jurisdictions studied in the paper, save Alberta and Manitoba.
When turning to measuring the strength of FOI laws we can see that some
excellent work has been done in this area in recent years. For example Vleugels
(2009) provides a ranking system for national FOI regulations based on the number of
annual FOI requests per 100,000 citizens.

But, this does not take account of

responses to those requests – something Lidberg (2009) regards as a crucial indicator
of the legislation’s operational effectiveness and the government’s commitment to
FOI. Hazell and Worthy (2010) consider various measures to test the performance of
an FOI act, two of which are the number of FOI requests and the number of requests
granted. They argue that the higher the numbers of requests and responses, the
healthier the FOI regime (Hazell and Worthy, 2010). However, these approaches are
very different from those employed by the CPI in studying lobbying regulations.
Where the CPI’s index is a de jure measure of lobbying regulations, these approaches
to measuring FOI are outcome measures only.

Combining the results of these

outcome measures of FOI with the CPI’s lobbying measures would be like adding
apples and oranges. In this context, employing Centre for Law and Democracy’s
(CLD) measure of FOI, set out in their Right to Information (RTI) rating
methodology, would be an ideal means of examining the comparative openness of
societies around the world.

The CLD’s RTI measure of the strength of FOI

legislation is, as a de jure measure of FOI regulations, very similarly to the CPI’s
measure for lobbying regulations - due to the RTI’s use of 61 questions set within
seven categories of disclosure, with a maximum possible score of 150 points.8 The
CLD writes:

8

http://www.law-democracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/COVER-NOTE.pdf
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The indicators ‘are drawn from a wide range of international standards
on the right to information, as well as comparative study of numerous
right to information laws from around the world. The indicators are
grouped into seven main categories, as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Right of Access
Scope
Requesting Procedures
Exceptions and Refusals
Appeals
Sanctions and Protections
Promotional Measures9

Thus, as with the CPI methodology, each FOI law has been analyzed by the
CLD through means of textual analysis and then assigned a number value based on
the 61 question asked. The scoring will come in between a minimum of 1 and a
maximum of 150. This methodology, as with the CPI’s contains a clear set of scoring
rules as to how points are attributed – so as to ensure consistency across different
countries. “The assessments were based primarily on the main right to information
law, as well as the constitution and, as appropriate, subordinate and supporting
legislation.”10 That the CLD also used local experts to review their analysis of FOI in
each of the jurisdictions, as well as accounting for the fact that some of the countries
are unitary states and others are federal, makes the CLD’s approach a robust means of
analyzing FOI legislation worldwide.
We provide the CLD’s RTI scores for FOI legislation in each of the
jurisdictions in Table 4. These are set out in descending order. We also normalise
these scores around 100 in order to make them similar to the CPI’s scores for
lobbying regulations.
Table 4: CLD’s RTI scores for FOI
Jurisdiction
RTI score for FOI

9

RTI score normalised too
100

http://www.law-democracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/COVER-NOTE.pdf
http://www.law-democracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/COVER-NOTE.pdf

10

13
Slovenia
130
86.6
UK
97
64.7
US
89
59.3
Hungary
87
58
Ireland
86
57.33
Australia
84
56
Canada Federal
79
52.6
France
70
46.7
Israel
68
45.32
Denmark
66
44
Lithuania
61
40.7
Poland
61
40.7
Taiwan
60
40
Germany
54
36
Philippians
N/A
0
Spain
N/A
0
Source:
http://www.law-democracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Chart-whyperlinks.pdf
Table 4 shows that the highest ranked jurisdiction in terms of the CLD’s RTI scoring
system is Slovenia at 130, normalised to 86.6. There is a significant gap back to the
next jurisdiction which is the UK, followed by the US. The US, Hungary, Ireland and
Australia are all located within 5 points of each other. Canada and France are the
only jurisdictions in the 70s. Bunched fairly close together, all within 8 points of each
other are the five jurisdictions located between 68 and 60, with Germany at 54
coming in last. The CLD’s RTI has no scores for the last two countries that we are
examining – the Philippians and Spain. Of the 16 countries being examined, 5 (the
UK, US, Australia, Canada and Ireland) are “Anglo-Saxon” and occupy 5 of the 7 top
places in terms of FOI. Three of these countries are also federal states.

‘Sunshine Scores’
Having measures of lobbying regulation robustness (on a 100 point scale) and those
for FOI strength, also on a 100 point scale, the objective is to sum both of these
measures in order to arrive at what is referred to as a ‘Sunshine Score’. This sunshine
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score will therefore have a maximum value of 200, where the closer it is to the
maximum, the more transparency and accountability is promoted within the
jurisdiction. While the absolute value (between 0 and 200) is of importance, what is
also of interest is how the jurisdictions rank against each other in terms of overall
sunshine, and if there are any discernible trends regarding how the jurisdictions score
in terms of both lobbying regulation and FOI measures. Table 4 summarizes the main
findings.
Table 4: Transparency Measures – CPI Scores, FOI Scores and
Scores
Jurisdiction
CPI Score
RTI Score
(normalised
to 100)
High Lobbying Regulations
US
62
59.3

overall Sunshine
Sunshine
Score
(out of 200)
121.3

Medium Lobbying Regulations
Canada Federal
Hungary
Lithuania
Philippians
Taiwan
Slovenia
Australia

50
45
44
39
38
35
33

52.6
58
40.7
0
40
86.6
56

102.6
103
84.7
39
78
121.6
89

Low Lobbying Regulations
Poland
Israel
France
Germany

27
21
19
17

40.66
45.32
46.7
36

67.7
66.3
65.7
53

No Lobbying Regulations
Ireland
0
57.33
57.33
Denmark
0
44
44
UK
0
64.7
64.7
Spain
0
0
0
Source:
Chari
et
al.,
2010;
http://www.law-democracy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/09/Chart-w-hyperlinks.pdf
When considering the overall sunshine scores of all jurisdictions, we see that the
highest is Slovenia at 121.6. It is only 0.3 ahead of the US in terms of overall

15
transparency. That US federal transparency and accountability legislation is ranked
relatively high in this instance can be explained by the fact that lobbying rules at the
federal level are, since 2007, more robust than those found in any other country, as
well as in many of the US states, giving the federal government a higher CPI score,
thereby offsetting its relatively low RTI score in comparison with Slovenia. In fact,
the gap between Slovenia and the US in lobbying legislation is reverend in terms of
the strength of their FOI legislation. Hungary has the third highest Sunshine Score at
103, just slightly ahead of Canada. The fifth highest sunshine shore belongs to
Lithuania at 84.7, making it the third former Eastern Bloc country in the top five.
What we also see amongst these top five countries is how, apart from Slovenia, their
CPI and FOI scores appear to match each other.
In the case of Australia, for instance, we see that its higher RTI score, as
opposed to CPI score, indicates a greater emphasis on the regulation of the actions of
state officials as opposed to private interests. This is something that has been noted in
relation to Australia's lobbying codes of conduct since the 1980s. There is a tradition
to regulating state officials in Australia, going back as far as the 1979, when the
Committee of Inquiry Concerning Public Duty and Private Interest produced a report
that formed the backbone of the Australian Public Service code of conduct.24 That
report’s focus on public servants also set the tone for Australia’s approach to
regulating lobbying, placing the onus for monitoring and enforcing lobbying
regulations on public servants, not the lobbyists (Hogan et al., 2011). Thus, the onus
for ensuring transparency, through codes of conduct for lobbyists, essentially falls on
the government representatives.
For the countries with low and no lobbying regulations the gap between their
CIP and RTI scores widens as the CIP score decreases. Spain is the only country that
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we selected to examine that has neither a CPI score (as there is no lobbying
regulation) or a RTI score (as it could not be determined by the CLD). Although
Spain has FOI legislation, the CLD was not able to calculate and RTI for it.
Table 5: Top 10 sunshine scores
Jurisdiction
Slovenia
US
Hungary
Canada
Australia
Lithuania
Taiwan
Poland
Israel
France

Sunshine Score
121.6
121.3
103
102.6
89
84.7
78
67.7
66.3
65.7

While the European jurisdictions tend to have a lower CPI score, they make up for
this with higher RTI scores. As a result, two of the top three countries in terms of
their overall sunshine scores are Slovenia and Hungary. Of the highest scoring
European countries, four of the top five are former Easter Bloc countries (Lithuania
was an actual republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)). France
was the highest scoring Western European country. The sunshine scores of the
Germany, Denmark, Ireland and Spain represent the lowest scoring jurisdictions
examined in this study. Particularly, in the case of these latter countries (apart from
Germany), the fact that they have not implemented any form of lobbying regulations
means they do not have a CPI score and this impacts significantly upon their low
overall sunshine scores.
Thus, we can see that the Sunshine score presents a more rounded measure,
and as such deepens out understanding, of transparency and accountability within any
given jurisdiction. Weak FOI regulations can be offset by strong lobbying regulations
or vice versa, ensuring an open and accountable government and society.
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When attempting to decipher if there are any trends between lobbying
regulation and FOI scores, one sees that states with medium and low lobbying
regulation possess a wide range of FOI scores, so it is difficult to conclude that there
is a discernible trend.

However, there is some evidence that relatively robust

lobbying rules do go hand in hand with high FOI scores. This is the case for the US
(which had the highest CPI score and the 2nd highest RTI score of the sample),
Canada (2nd highest CPI, 7th highest RTI), and Hungary (3rd CPI, 3rd RTI). We have
also seen that in some instances weak CPI scores are offset by strong RTI scores, and
weak RTI scores are offset by strong CPI scores. It is difficult to ascertain that a
general rule can be derived from these findings, as relatively high-ranking CPI
jurisdictions (such as Lithuania and the Philippians) either have low RTI scores or do
not produce data that would enable the CLD to calculate RTI scores. However, there
is some evidence that having relatively weak RTI scores does correspond with having
no lobbying regulations whatsoever – as in the cases of Spain and Denmark.
Of course, once Ireland, the UK, Spain and Denmark have introduced
lobbying regulations their sunshine scores should change significantly – indicative of
greater transparency in their societies. This was the situation in Australia after 2007
with the reintroduction of lobbying regulations which saw its CPI score rise from 0 to
33 and in the US in the same year due to its reform of the lobbying law at the federal
level where the CIP score jumped from 36 to 62 (Charil et al., 2010).

Conceptual Map of Transparency
As with lobbying and lobbying regulation, there is no clear definition of what
governmental transparency is (Florini, 2007). However, as we now possess CPI and
RTI scores for each of the jurisdictions examined, we can position the location of
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each on a conceptual transparency map. The idea for this kind of a map is borrowed
from Lijphart’s (1999) concept of a conceptual map of democracies. The x–axis –
regulated transparency – represents the rigour of lobbying regulations. The y-axis –
informational transparency – represents the effectiveness of FOI legislation. The
units on each axis constitute standard deviations, in order to show how much variation
there is from the average, in terms of the rigour and effectiveness of regulated and
informational transparency (respectively) in each jurisdiction. High values indicate
stronger lobbying regulations and more effective FOI legislation.

For each

jurisdiction their position on the map is indicative of their Sunshine Score and the
strength of that score in relation to every other jurisdiction plotted and also in relation
to the FOI and CPI means for all 16 national jurisdictions examined.

Figure 1: Two dimensional conceptual map of transparency
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Out on the right of the map is the US, with its strong lobbying regulations and high
FOI rules, followed by Canada, Hungary and Lithuania, though Lithuania’s FOI is
relatively low. Far to the left are places like the UK, Ireland, Denmark and Spain
without any lobbying rules in place. Near to the top of the map is Slovenia with its
very high RTI score and relatively high CPI score, while in addition to Spain, the
Philippians lies as the bottom of the map due to its having not RTI score.
On the lobbying regulation dimension, all jurisdictions are within 2 standard
deviations of the mean. Apart from the US, all other jurisdictions are in fact within
1.5 standard deviations to the right or left of the mean. On the FOI regulations
dimension Slovenia is almost two standard deviations above the mean, while Spain
and the Philippians are just over two standard deviations below the mean. In many
respects, Slovenia is a true outlier, located more than twice as far above the mean as
any other jurisdiction, the nearest county to it on the FOI axis being the UK.
We can see how jurisdictions in the top right hand quadrant of the
transparency map, the US, Canada, Hungary, Slovenia and Australia seem to have
achieved a balance between lobbying regulation and FOI legislations. Most of these
jurisdictions are located above the trend line – being amongst the most transparent
jurisdictions that we examined. Taiwan, Lithuania and the Philippians are located in
the lower right hand quadrant, below the trend line. These states have medium
lobbying regulations, but their RTI scores were relatively low, and 0 in the case of the
Philippians. Poland is on the border of this quadrant. Germany, Denmark and Spain
are in the lower left hand quadrant.

These countries have both low lobbying

regulations and FOI regulations also. Israel is right on the border of this quadrant,
with its FOI exactly on the mean, while its CPI is slightly below the mean. France,
the UK and Ireland are located in the top left hand quadrant. Their FOI scores are
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well above the mean, but whereas France’s CPI is relatively low, both Ireland and the
UK score 0 on CPI – as neither had lobbying regulations in place. Ireland and the UK
were the only jurisdictions without lobbying regulations to be located above the FOI
mean, while Denmark, another country without lobbying regulations, comes very
close to that mean.

Spain, located in the bottom left hand corner of the map, is

representative of jurisdictions without lobbying regulation and which, although they
have FOI legislation, the CLD has been unable to provide an RTI score for.
From Figure 1 there is a slight upward trend in RTI scores, as CPI scores
increase from left to right. States with high lobbying regulations tend to have slightly
more effective FOI legislation. This suggests that stronger regulation of the actions of
state officials leads to stronger regulation of those private interests attempting to
influence those same state officials – namely lobbyists. This finding is supported by
the fact that 4 of the 7 countries located to the right of the mean for lobbying
regulations are also above the mean of the informational transparency dimension,
with Taiwan and Lithuania very close to that mean. The only real outlier in the two
right hand quadrant was the Philippians, which has no RTI score at all. Of the 4
jurisdictions without lobbying regulations examined here, the UK and Ireland had
FOI scores above the mean. In the cases of Denmark and Spain their RTI scores
came in below the FOI mean. This suggests that stronger lobbying regulations and
stronger FOI regulations tends to go together – as is borne out by the ascending trend
line. Developing rules for transparency in relation to private interests leads to rules
for transparency in relation to state officials and vice versa.
The governments in both Ireland and the UK, countries that introduced FOI
regulations around the turn of the century, are currently considering the introduction
of lobbying regulations. This suggests that once a jurisdiction introduces either FOI
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rules or lobbying regulations, an acceptance of the broader concept of transparency
occurs that gradually leads to both sets of regulations coming into force. We have
seen this with the rapidly increasing number of jurisdictions that have introduced
lobbying regulations since the turn of the century, as well as the gradual strengthening
of extant regulations at the federal, state and provincial levels in the US, Canada and
Australia (Chari et al., 2010). In this respect, we have found that time tends to also be
an important factor, as the longer either lobbying regulations or FOI legislation is in
place, the more likely it is to undergo revisions, and in most cases these revisions
tend, overall, to produce stronger transparency legislation and regulations.
The conceptual map in Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of relative
transparency in each jurisdiction, and as such constitutes a transparency snapshot. In
a couple of years, the relative positions of the jurisdictions will have all changed as
they introduce/reform their lobbying regulations, or alter the workings of their FOI
legislation. As such, this map will serve as a historic artefact, enabling us to track the
shifting transparency of each country, state and province mapped here.

Conclusion
Despite the existence of a wide-ranging literature on FOI legislation and lobbying
regulations, no study has sought to integrate both forms of transparency regulations
into a comprehensive transparency measure – what we call a sunshine score. Nor, has
a comparative study on this scale, involving 16 national jurisdictions, sought to
understand, compare and contrast FOI and lobbying regulations in order to discover
trends in relation to transparency and accountability.
The article initially provides details as to how FOI legislation and lobbying
regulations constitute two sides of the transparency debate. Both sets of regulations
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seek to shine a light into the black box of policy making from different directions,
with FOI legislation focusing on the actions of state officials, while lobbying
regulations concentrate on the actions of those trying to influence state officials. The
article then discussed case selection criteria and provided a brief overview on the
development FOI legislation in each jurisdiction. This encompassed the different
waves in the introduction of FOI legislation, starting with the first wave in the US in
the mid 1960s and ending with Taiwan in 2006.
The article’s first objective was to offer a means of measuring the
effectiveness of FOI legislation in each jurisdiction – their “FOI scores”. This was
achieved using the CLD’s RTI scores for FOI legislations. The CLD has examined
FOI regulation in 90 countries in total, but we were primarily interest in those
countries that also had lobbying regulations in place or were close to the introducing
such regulations.
The article’s second object was to develop an overarching transparency
measure, what we refer to here as a sunshine score. The RTI scores set out here were
combined with Chari et al’s (2010) use of CPI scores for the rigour of lobbying
regulations, to provide the sunshine score of the overall level of transparency in each
country studied.
These sunshine scores then permitted the development of a two dimensional
conceptual map of regulated and informational transparency in each jurisdiction.
From this we can see how having more effective FOI legislation, or more rigorous
lobbying regulations, impacts upon the positing of each jurisdiction. But also how,
over time, these jurisdictions might move in relation to one another, as their FOI
legislation becomes more effective or they reform their lobbying regulations.
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Thus, this study has been concerned with presenting the level of transparency
in 16 jurisdictions by looking at both their FOI and lobbying regulations.

By

combining the RTI scores for FOI legislation with CPI scores for lobbying
regulations, the study has produced what we refer to as sunshine scores. These
provide an insight into the overall levels of transparency in each jurisdiction. As
political acts are public acts, deliberative democratic theory suggests democracy can
be enhanced through publicity and accountability. It is certainly the case that in
combination, FOI laws and lobbying regulations have the potential to offer
democratic societies the opportunity of moving beyond representative democracy to
deliberative democracy, where the decisions of the agent (politicians) and the actions
of those trying to influence them (lobbyists) are visible to the principle (the general
public). Thus, through the greater transparency offered by effective FOI legislations
and strong lobbying regulations the dangers of moral hazard are negated –
representatives pursuing private interests over those of the public – as their
behaviours are observable.
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